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Abstract
Exploiting three Italian earthquakes as quasi-experiments, we analyze
the response of homeowners’ consumption to transfers targeted to finance
housing reconstruction over time—which, like loans, mainly affect the liq-
uidity of households’ wealth in the short run. We show that transfers that
have no effect on consumption over a multi-year horizon, can have significant
heterogeneous effects on impact. The access to reconstruction funds strongly
raises non-durable consumption by households with low liquidity and bank
debt, but makes no difference for liquid households, or when cash accrues
directly to firms—in line with recent analyses of the consumption dynamics
of ‘wealthy hand-to-mouth.’
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1 Introduction
Households with a positive net wealth should be in a position to smooth con-
sumption in the face of temporary income and expenditure shocks. Yet, recent
theoretical and empirical literature emphasizes that their ability to do so depends
on the liquidity of their portfolios—namely, the overall costs of obtaining cash
against their assets. By applying the methodology of Blundell et al. (2008) to
data of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Kaplan et al. (2014) document
that the consumption of “wealthy hand-to-mouth” households responds signifi-
cantly to transitory income shocks. In the theoretical work after Kaplan and
Violante (2014), “wealthy hand-to-mouth” are households with a large fraction
of their wealth in illiquid assets (such as housing). Evidence consistent with the
predictions of the theory is also provided, among others, by Misra and Surico
(2014), who find a large propensity to consume out of the U.S. tax rebates among
homeowners with high mortgage debt.1
In this paper, we contribute empirical micro-evidence to this literature by ex-
amining the impact of transfers that raise the liquidity of portfolios owned by the
relatively wealthy, but not necessarily liquid, households. Using public transfer
programs in the aftermath of three earthquakes in Italy as quasi-experiments, we
analyze the consumption response of homeowners residing in a disaster area, who
suffer damages to their housing units, and receive public money to finance repair
and reconstruction work.
Our case studies qualify as suitable quasi-experiments on four grounds. The first
is the randomness of the event that defines our treatment group. In the aftermath
of an earthquake, homeowners both suffer from a random expenditure shock, due
to the need of fixing damages to their housing, and benefit from the entitlement
to reconstruction transfers. Moreover, the stock of housing in the disaster regions
consists of historical buildings not conforming to anti-seismic norms—luxury and
ordinary units are similarly vulnerable to damages from earthquakes. By this
feature of the sample, the distribution of damages and thus of public transfers is
unlikely to be systematically related to the households’ wealth and liquidity levels.
The second is the fact that the transfers considered in our analysis are strictly
targeted to finance reconstruction work. Their amount is determined based on
a technical assessment of the damages, and homeowners are required to carry
out the work according to preset standards and document its costs—they cannot
redirect funds at their discretion. However, in the short run, the cash accruing to
households allows them to finance current consumption expenditure against lower
consumption in the future. In this respect, the transfers in our analysis are akin to
short-term loans. The third is that funds exclusively accrue to owner-occupiers,
households who own real estate but may have a mortage and/or a low level of
liquid assets. Finally, the amount of the transfers is large relative to households’
current income.
The three case studies we focus on are (i) the 1980 earthquake in the South
1See Section 2 for a discussion of the recent contributions.
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of Italy, a strong seismic event hitting a large geographical area including the
regions of Campania and Basilicata; (ii) the 2012 earthquake in the Emilia region,
which was less damaging and more concentrated geographically; and (iii) the 2009
earthquake which destroyed the city of L’Aquila and significantly damaged the
area around this city. The selection of our three case studies is dictated by the
availability of micro data, drawn from the Bank of Italy Survey of Households’
Income and Wealth (SHIW).
In the case of the 1980 earthquake in the South of Italy, the transfer program was
initially restricted to the residents in Campania and a small area in Basilicata;
it was extended with a delay to cover the whole earthquake area in the Basili-
cata region. Exploiting the institutional features of government interventions, we
can thus study the consumption behavior of homeowners with access to transfers
in the earthquake area—our treatment group—against multiple control groups.
Households in our sample are differentiated by (i) residence inside or outside the
earthquake region, (ii) entitlement to transfers in the first or the second year after
the disaster (which determines the timing of cash payments to homeowners). In
the other two case studies, there was no delay in extending transfers to different
groups of homeowners. Yet, we can exploit accurate information about the house-
holds’ portfolio compositions (not available for the years of our first case study),
so to refine our treatment and control groups depending on whether homeown-
ers (with or without access to transfers) have a high/low liquid-wealth-to-income
ratio and bank debt. Finally, the 2009 earthquake in Abruzzo differs from the
other cases, in that the government directly paid the firms carrying out the re-
construction work, rather than providing homeowners with reconstruction funds.
Hence we can analyze whether household consumption responds to transfers when
these are in kind rather than in cash. In conducting our econometric analysis, we
follow the literature and focus on nondurable consumption as the main variable
of interest. In the case of earthquake, this choice helps us to minimize the risk
of confusing consumption/saving choices with expenditures on replacing essential
household items damaged in the earthquake.
Our main results are as follows. Using the 1980 case study we show that, over the
1980-1984 period as a whole, nondurable consumption by homeowners in the earth-
quake area eligible to receive the transfers is not significantly different from the
consumption of homeowners residing outside the earthquake area—consistent with
the fact that the transfers are targeted to finance reconstruction work on hous-
ing units. However, the consumption of the former group is significantly higher
in the sub-period 1981-82, at the time when the programme is implemented and
households gain access to funds—in our estimate, the impact marginal propensity
to consume out of the transfers is 22 percent. This initial peak in consumption is
then offset by a marked contraction in the following two years, 1983-84.
We are especially interested in verifying whether the consumption response is
heterogenous across households with different wealth liquidity—detailed informa-
tion on wealth is only available for the years of the earthquakes in Emilia and
Abruzzo. In these two case studies, we can identify illiquid households, i.e. house-
holds with a relatively low liquidity-to-wealth ratio and bank debt. We can then
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compare liquid and illiquid owner-occupiers residing in the earthquake region, with
control groups defined by households with similar characteristics residing either
in the neighboring Italian regions, or in the rest of the country. We obtain two
complementary but distinct results. In our 2012 Emilia case study, where cash
transfers are made to households, nondurable consumption by owner-occupiers
rises significantly relative to the control group. Including all homeowners (liquid
and illiquid) in the sample, our estimate of the marginal propensity to consume
is not far from the average estimate for the South of Italy—27 vs. 22 percent.
However, splitting the sample, we show that the significant response of the home-
owners’ nondurable consumption to transfers is driven exclusively by the behavior
of illiquid households—liquid owner-occupiers in the earthquake area behave ex-
actly like those in the rest of Italy. For the group of illiquid owner-occupiers, the
marginal propensity to consume out of transfer is 57 percent, twice as high as our
average estimate for the whole sample.
In our 2009 Abruzzo case study, where cash was paid out not to households,
but directly to firms conducting reconstruction work, we detect no significant
heterogeneity in households’ consumption, whether they are liquid or illiquid.
Together, these results provide evidence that the consumption response to cash
transfers is systematically different from the response to their in-kind equivalent,
in the form of repairing services, and hinges on the initial liquidity position of the
household.
A key concern in our study is the possibility that the earthquakes may have
direct or indirect effects on the consumption by resident homeowners which may
conflate with the effects of the transfers. First, households may face the need to
replace items destroyed or lost in the disaster, well in advanced to their natural
wear-and-tear process. Second, in line with the literature on the topic, the earth-
quake may actually raise incomes and employment prospects in the area, driven
by the demand for goods and services connected with reconstruction activities.
Using the specific features of our first case study, we can address this concern by
relying on residents in the earthquake area as a control group. In particular, in one
of our exercises we are able to compare the consumption by owner-occupiers when
they become eligible to transfers, with that by all the other residents in the earth-
quake area, who may be exposed to similar shocks and face a similar economic
environment. The empirical evidence confirms the strong effects of transfers on
the nondurable consumption of homeowners.
Our econometric exercises rely on microeconomic data drawn from the Bank
of Italy Surveys of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), providing detailed
household-level information on disposable income, consumption, residential sta-
tus, as well as employment status, education and age of the householder and the
number of households components. In the years around the 1980 earthquake in
the South of Italy, these Surveys mainly report repeated cross-sectional data; for
the later earthquake episodes, they include a panel of households, as well as de-
tailed information about households’ portfolios. For our institutional analysis, we
rely on a variety of public sources, including official documents and newspaper
articles.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 maps our study in the
literature. Section 3 is devoted to our 1980 earthquake case study, discussing
facts, institutional details, study design, econometric methodology and results, in
turn. Following a similar scheme, Section 4 is devoted to the 2012 earthquake in
Emilia and the 2009 earthquake in Abruzzo. Section 5 concludes.
2 Relation to the literature
The main goal of our study is to investigate whether transfers targeted to finance
the costs of fixing the housing damages caused by the random occurrence of an
earthquake can have an effect on consumption, arguably through their impact
on the liquidity of the households’ wealth. Thus our study naturally relates to
several strands of the empirical literature testing the role of liquidity constraints
in consumption decisions.
To start with, we have already noted that the transfers in our study are akin to
loans. Despite its preset destination, the cash made available up-front to house-
holds can be used to finance current consumption against future income and/or
expenditure adjustment. From this perspective, our study can be brought to bear
on the conclusions of empirical work assessing the consumption sensitivity to (vari-
ations in) credit availability, such as Gross and Souleles (2002). These authors
document that the response to an increase in the supply of credit, i.e. a rise in
credit card limits, is stronger for households close to their credit utilization rate
limits. They interpret their result as evidence on the key role played by liquidity
constraints in consumer behavior. Significant heterogeneity by income and wealth
is also found in studies analyzing the impact of variations in housing wealth on
spending. According to Mian and Sufi (2014) , for instance, an increase in hous-
ing prices has a strong impact on the consumption of low-income households, who
aggressively borrow against housing equity to spend, but has virtually no effect on
high-income households. Robust evidence on the consumption impact of changes
in credit conditions is nonetheless difficult to produce, in light of the well-known
issues in identifying supply and demand conditions separately: lenders may in-
crease credit supply because they anticipate a strong credit demand; conversely,
households may demand more credit in anticipation of large purchases.2 The fact
that in our quasi-experiments the entitlement to transfers is driven by the random
effects of a natural disaster arguably lessens these endogeneity concerns.
Second, in our case studies, the transfers accrue exclusively to owner-occupiers,
who on average are not poor, but are not necessarily liquid. A large share of
owner-occupiers’ wealth is invested in their house, hence, especially in financially
repressed economies like the Italian regions in our sample, hardly accessible for
consumption smoothing purposes (supporting evidence of deviations from the per-
manent income hypothesis in our sample is provided in Section 5 below).3 By the
2To alleviate the endogeneity concerns, for instance, Gross and Souleles (2002) use detailed
information about issuers’ credit supply policy.
3Guiso et al. (1994) provide ample evidence that, historically, credit market imperfections in
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same token, a significant share of owner-occupiers have a mortgage, requiring them
to generate a steady cash flow to service their bank debt. From this perspective,
our evidence can be brought to bear on the predictions of recent literature, espe-
cially after Kaplan et al. (2014), that transfers affect consumption by raising the
liquidity of homeowners’ overall portfolios.
While in our work we focus on natural disasters at local level using Italian data,
our results—that the consumption of illiquid households significantly rises in the
year in which the transfers are paid out—resonate with the findings of many con-
tributions focused on crisis periods using U.S. data. Namely, studies of the U.S.
fiscal stimulus payment episodes of 2001 and 2008 suggest that (i) overall, house-
holds spend a non negligible share of a cash transfer on nondurable goods, and (ii)
there is significant heterogeneity in consumption responses due to differences in
wealth liquidity and the degree of indebtedness of the homeowners. Regarding the
2001 stimulus, the cumulative change in expenditures on nondurable goods during
the quarter of the tax rebate and the subsequent three-month period is estimated
to be roughly 70 percent of the amount rebated (Johnson et al., 2006). Between
20 and 40 percent of the rebate is spent in the quarter when funds are received.
This strong consumption response is measured relative to the control group of
households that do not receive the rebate in that same quarter. For the same
episode, Agarwal et al. (2007) show that the highest response is by households
who are initially (most likely to be) liquidity constrained.4 For the 2008 stimulus,
Broda and Parker (2014), and Parker et al. (2013) conclude that a significant
effect is detectable only in the quarter in which households receive their rebates.
However, in that quarter the share of the stimulus payment spent on nondurable
goods is large, in line with the estimates for the 2001 stimulus.
Both Shapiro and Slemrod (2009) and Misra and Surico (2014) stress pro-
nounced heterogeneity in the response to the stimulus across recipients. In par-
ticular, in both episodes of U.S. tax rebates (2001 and 2008), Misra and Surico
(2014) documents that half of the population does not respond to the rebates at
all; 20% of households consume more than half of the cash—the response by the
rest of the population being somewhere in between.5 Moreover, these authors find
the largest propensity to consume out of the tax rebate among households who
own real estate and have a mortgage debt. Consistent with the evidence for the
U.S., Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014) find that the MPC out of rebate checks in Italy
is 0.65 for the lowest cash-on-hand households, and 0.30 for the highest. Relating
this literature to our work, however, we should stress an important difference in
studies of national versus local transfer programs. The former raise a number of
general-equilibrium issues in the transmission of fiscal policy—ranging from po-
Italy have long been pervasive, limiting households’ ability to borrow.
4Evidence on financing constraints at the household level is also documented by Jappelli
(1990) and Jappelli et al. (1998) among others.
5Misra and Surico (2014) emphasizes that heterogeneity is likely to be blurred in analyses
that split the sample only according to income groups, because a large marginal propensity to
consume tends to be found for both low and high income households. In their findings, the
spending propensity of a sizable fraction of high income/high debt households is significantly
larger than the spending propensity of low income/non owner occupier households.
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tential effects on market interest rates to the anticipation of higher taxation in
the future—that are not as relevant in regional analyses. The earthquakes in our
case studies had negligible effects on bond prices and policy rates at national level.
The transfers accruing to the earthquake areas were not financed at all by local
taxes.
Finally, our findings can be interpreted as a refinement of the conclusions from
the earlier literature that, like ours, exploits natural disasters as quasi-experiments
to study consumption behavior. Most notably, the work by (Sawada and Shimizu-
tani, 2008) relies on retrospective surveys to analyze households’ consumption
around the 1995 earthquake in Kobe, Japan. These authors conclude that con-
sumption is not smoothed by households who ex post consider themselves to be
credit-constrained at the time of the disaster. Our findings further suggests that
consumption behavior in the disaster area may have been significantly different
depending on liquidity indicators.
3 The consumption response to reconstruction trans-
fers: evidence from the 1980 earthquake in the South
of Italy
This section focuses on our first case study, the major earthquake that hit the
South of Italy on November 23, 1980. The earthquake affected a large area com-
prising two regions, Campania and Basilicata, with a combined population of
about 6 million inhabitants (approximately 11 percent of the Italian population).
Its effects were devastating. About 350,000 houses either collapsed or were seri-
ously damaged and a much larger number suffered less serious damages. More-
over, the earthquake caused 2,734 deaths and left 8,850 people seriously wounded
(Commissione Parlamentare di Inchiesta, 1991).
3.1 Institutional setting and study design
In response to the 1980 earthquake, the bulk of government interventions consisted
of a massive transfer program aimed at speeding up reconstruction.6 Based on
the available official information (Commissione Parlamentare di Inchiesta, 1991),
between 1981 and 1984 (the period of our interest for the empirical investiga-
tion) the Italian government mobilized resources up to 8 trillions of Italian liras,
equivalent to about 28.5 percent of the 1981 GDP in the earthquake area. A
sizeable part of these funds was targeted to rebuild private dwellings. Specifically,
owner-occupiers of damaged housing units were entitled to receive a cash transfer
towards expenditure needed to ‘restore habitability’. By the end of 1989, the funds
budgeted by the Italian government to finance private reconstruction amounted
to 32 trillions liras.
6The overall response to the earthquake relied on a variety of instruments, ranging from
emergency immediate assistance, to relieving young people from military duties (see Cipollone
and Rosolia, 2007) and granting residents in the earthquake area a temporary tax relief.
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The transfer program was restricted to owner-occupiers, and strictly targeted
to finance repair and reconstruction work on the main household residence. The
transfers covered repair work up to 110 squared meters; work on any additional
squared meters was to be financed privately by the owners, while secondary and
vacation residences only qualified for a small subsidy. The amount of funds was
set according to technical estimates of the costs of repairing earthquake-related
damages. These estimates were produced by technical employees of the munic-
ipalities, working in coordination with both local and central authorities, based
on preset engineering and economic standards. Reconstruction was regulated by
strict rules. Collapsed houses were to be reconstructed in the exact location and
with the same characteristics as the pre-existing units. Owners were required
to finance on their own any improvement relative to the pre-existing conditions.
There was limited freedom in contracting workers: the government provided a
list of (usually local) firms the households could contact to carry out the repair
work. The 1991 report by the Commissione Parlamentare di Inchiesta emphasizes
that, in the initial phase of the reconstruction period (1981-1984), public funds
were allocated with a strict adherence to the reconstruction rules and technical
parameters in the assessment of costs.7
Housing units included in the programmes were classified in three categories,
ranked by the scale of the damage: (i) collapsed units, (ii) seriously damaged units,
and (iii) mildly damaged units. In the case of houses in the third category, owners
obtained the entire amount of the transfer up-front. In the case of houses in the
first two categories, one fourth of the total transfer was provided up-front, at the
time of the application for the transfer, and the rest upon providing documented
expenditures and a technical report on the work done (Law 219/81). Importantly,
with the official communication of the transfer, the households were open a credit
line at a local bank, which provided the initial sum.
It is worth emphasizing that the stock of housing in this earthquake area, as
well as in the areas considered in the next sections, consists of historical buildings
not conforming to anti-seismic criteria: luxury and ordinary housing are similarly
vulnerable to earthquakes. This observation motivates the maintained assumption
throughout our empirical study, that in our sample the distribution of damages
is random across homeowners with different wealth and liquidity levels, so that
the public funds are not systematically related to these key characteristics of the
households in our sample. In any case, our regression models include controls for
the household disposable income and a variety of indicators such as the number
of members of the household, as well as the age, the level of education and the
employment status of the householder. These indicators are included to absorb
household-specific differences in consumption expenditure.
7At the end of the 1980s, an extensive inquiry into corruption and criminal activities around
the management of public funds for reconstruction was realized (Commissione Parlamentare
di Inchiesta, 1991). The Commissione documents that, in general, illegal practices were very
much contained in the first phase of reconstruction activities, that is before 1984, when most of
the funds were targeted to individual households with very restrictive criteria. However, such
practices were more prevalent in the second phase, when funds were targeted to public works.
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The earthquake hit the Basilicata municipalities with an intensity and level
of destruction comparable to Campania municipalities. Yet, the program was
extended to the two areas in the earthquake regions at different times, mainly
reflecting randomness in the political process. Virtually all municipalities in Cam-
pania were included in the program by mid 1981. Out of 549 municipalities in
this region, 337 were included already by January, and another 205 by the end
of May. In the Basilicata region, only municipalities right at the epicenter of the
earthquake were included in the initial list. The law extending the transfer pro-
gram to all Basilicata municipalities hit by the disaster was passed only later in
the year, on November 13, 1981. As a result, accounting for the timing of admin-
istrative procedures, the payment of transfers in the two regions started in two
different calendar years. The date of the earthquake (end of 1980) and the date
of the program extension (end of 1981) allow us to use yearly data for 1980, 1981,
and 1982 to distinguish the pre-earthquake year, and the early and late access to
transfers.
A key concern in our study is the possibility that the earthquake has direct or
indirect effects on homeowners’ consumption which may conflate with the effects
of transfers. In particular, to the extent that an earthquake results in the de-
struction of goods such as furniture and appliances, households may face the need
to replace them much in advance to their natural wear-and-tear process. These
material damages may thus translate into an exogenous earthquake-related shock,
causing households in the earthquake area to raise their consumption expenditure
irrespective of transfers. While this argument mainly applies to durable expendi-
tures, it could possibly be extended to some nondurable items (e.g. clothing) as
well.8
By the same token, consumption may respond to changes in incomes specifically
driven by the earthquake. As is well understood, the sign of these changes is am-
biguous. On the one hand, earthquakes typically result in a negative supply shock,
due to the destruction of physical/infrastructure capital, correlated with firm exits
or a drop in the level of production. On the other hand, new jobs and earning
opportunities arise with the reconstruction activities and public transfers, gener-
ating a positive demand shock for goods and services produced in the earthquake
area.9 Indeed, several studies find that earthquakes have a non-negative impact
8Using our survey data, we can document evidence of an anomalous rise in durable consump-
tion in the earthquake area, that can be interpreted as an indicator of an earthquake-related
shock to expenditures on these goods. Namely, while information on total durable consumption
is only available from 1980 on, we obtain a longer record using a subset of durable expenditures
from the survey item “consumi reali,” which records purchases of furniture, works of art and the
like. For this variable, we calculate the percentage of households that report a non-zero expendi-
ture, averaged over the four years before and after the earthquake, that is 1977-80 and 1981-84.
In the regions adjacent to the earthquake area, this percentage falls across the two periods, from
10.24 to 7.66 percent. Against this negative trend, in the earthquake area the percentage of
households reporting a non-zero expenditure rises from 8.66 to 12.55 percent. Hence, relative to
the control group, the earthquake area records a 50 percent increase. In our findings the rise is
stronger for owner-occupiers than for tenants.
9Work by Porcelli and Trezzi (2014) contrasts the negative supply effects of an earthquake
with the positive multiplier effects of public work and tax cuts in the earthquake regions in Italy.
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on average economic activity and growth (see Cavallo and Noy, 2009; Hochrainer,
2009; Noy, 2009). In line with this literature, we also find in our sample that
the disposable of incomes rose relative to the control group of adjacent regions in
Italy for three years, and return to the historical trend only in 1984. To illustrate
how this can raise potential issues for our estimation, suppose realistically that
incomes rise in tandem with reconstruction activities, and that the bulk of these
activities start in Basilicata with some delay compared to Campania (accidentally
following the same timing of the transfer program). Then, a hike in consumption
in Campania one year before that in Basilicata could be driven by variations in
disposable incomes, rather than the disbursement of public transfers.
Because of the possibility of these confounding effects, in our study we carry
out Difference-in-Differences analysis using two complementary specifications of
the empirical model. First, we will compare the consumption of owner-occupiers
in the earthquake area (eligible to transfers) with the consumption of owner-
occupiers outside the area. Second, we will run a model exploiting the variability
within the earthquake area. Namely, focusing on the residents in the earthquake
area only, we will compare the consumption of owner-occupiers when they become
eligible to transfers, with that of all the other residents who may be exposed to
similar shocks and face a similar economic environment. As already mentioned,
in our empirical exercises, we control for a number of household and householder
characteristics. Interestingly, these controls turn out not to play any role in our
results.
3.2 Evidence on Homeowners’ consumption
Our study relies on the Bank of Italy Survey of Households’ Income and Wealth
(SHIW). For the years around 1980, the SHIWs provide repeated cross-sectional,
household-level data for about 4,000 households, representatives of the Italian
population. The households in the disaster area amount to about 10 percent of
the national sample; of these, about 50 percent are owner-occupiers.
The Surveys do not collect household-level information on earthquake related
damages or transfers. However, since the transfer program was targeted to owner-
occupiers, and initially restricted to only part of the earthquake area, we can
rely on the households’ residential status (owner-occupier) and residence/year
(Campania from 1981 on, and Basilicata from 1982 on) to identify the households
with access to reconstruction transfers.
3.2.1 Non-durable consumption after the earthquake
We start our investigation by analyzing the change over time in the consumption of
owner-occupiers residing in the disaster area, relative to owner-occupiers residing
outside it. As a control area, we can use either the rest of Italy or, to consider a
more homogeneous sample, the regions adjacent to the disaster area. Since our
conclusion does not depend on this choice, to save space we only report results for
the comprehensive control group.
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Our empirical analysis exploits data relative to the first phase of the program, in
the period 1981-84, and distinguishes two subsamples: the two years immediately
after the earthquake (1981-82), when households applied to and started to re-
ceive public transfers, and the period of reconstruction work in the following two
years (1983-84). In particular, we adopt the following Difference-in-Differences
regression model
Ci,t = α+ ηt + δAi + µQUAKE i,t + γXi,t + εi,t (1)
where Ci,t is either nondurable consumption expenditure or its log; QUAKE i,t is
an identifier of owner-occupiers residing in the disaster area over different periods,
as detailed below; ηt is the time fixed effect, Ai is a dummy with value 1 for
the disaster area and 0 otherwise, while Xi,t is the vector of controls including
household disposable income, key characteristics of the householder, such as age,
education, employment status, sector where she works, and an index of the size
of the municipality where the households live.10
Based on the above model, we carry out three distinct exercises, aimed to shed
light on the evolution of the consumption responses to the transfers in the 1981-84
phase of the reconstruction programme. In the first exercise, we analyze the change
in consumption between 1980 and the post-earthquake adjustment period 1981-
1984 (QUAKE i,t is 1 for the period 1981-84). In the second exercise, we compare
consumption in 1980 relative to 1981-82, the two years when the transfer program
was implemented and households gained access to the funds (QUAKE i,t is 1 for
period 1981-82). In the last exercise, we compare owner-occupiers consumption
in the years 1981-82 and 1983-84, the core phase of reconstruction (QUAKE i,t is
1 for the period 1983-84 and we take 1981-82 as the base period).
Results Our estimation of (1) is shown in Table 1. In the table, we report
results for each exercise twice: in Panel A, the dependent variable is the level
of consumption; in Panel B, its logarithm. Results are consistent across the two
specifications.
Our key finding is twofold. First, relative to the control group, homeowners in
the disaster area do not rise their consumption over the time horizon of recon-
struction work. The nondurable consumption by homeowners in the disaster area
averaged over the 1981-1984 post-earthquake period, is not significantly different
from their consumption in 1980. This result is consistent with the fact that, by
design, the transfers in our analysis are not meant to be an income supplement,
but specifically compensate for the costs of repairing damages after the random
occurrence of the quake. It is worth noting that that this first finding addresses a
potential concern, that transfers were generous (hence a gift) relative to the actual
cost borne by the households. During the 1980 earthquake, housing repair costs
were estimated by employees of technical offices at municipality level. While these
10Different from later surveys, the 1980-84 surveys do not report information on the compo-
sition of households portfolios, so we cannot exploit information on assets and debt to build
indicators of wealth liquidity.
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public officers were required to strictly apply technical criteria, and were expected
to report to both local and central authorities, it might be possible that their
estimates varied across households and locations—depending on the willingness
of the technical employee of a municipality to circumvent checks and controls, and
inflate estimates in favor of people with whom she/he had political and personal
connections.11
Second, there are remarkable differences across subperiods: a strong expansion
of consumption in 1981-82 is followed by a strong contraction in 1983-4. Compared
to the pre-earthquake year 1980, nondurable consumption in the earthquake area
rises significantly in 1981-82, when the transfer program was implemented and
households gained access to funds—relative to consumption by households residing
outside the earthquake area. Column 2 suggests that the difference amounts to
about 9 percent. The initial increment in expenditure for nondurable consumption
is followed by a pronounced contraction in 1983-84. This contraction is somewhat
larger than the expansion in the previous two years, consistent with the result in
column 1.
For comparison, we have also estimated equation (1) for the subgroup of tenants
in our sample. For non homeowners, we do find no evidence of a consumption
response in the earthquake area during the 1981-82 period; if anything, we tend
to find a contraction.12
3.2.2 Controlling for the effects of the earthquake
In the analysis so far, we have compared owner-occupiers within and outside the
earthquake area. As explained above, however, earthquakes may have economic
effects that affect consumption independently of the transfer program. To control
for these effects, in Table 2, we identify the response of consumption to transfers
by comparing treatment and control groups selected from the sample of residents
in the earthquake area, i.e. relying exclusively on households exposed to the
earthquake shock. We restrict the sample to the period 1981-82.
In its general form, our empirical model can be written as follows:
Ci,t = α+ λ1Dt + λ2Dr + β1HSs + β2TRr,t + β3 (HSs · TRr,t) + γXi,t + ui,t, (2)
where Ci,t is either nondurable consumption expenditure by household i in year
t or its logarithm; HSs (standing for ‘Housing Status’) is a dummy that equals
one if the housing status s of the household is owner-occupier; TRr,t (standing
for ‘Transfer Region’) is a dummy indicating when the region r is included in
the transfer program—it equals one for households whose region of residence in
11By contrast, in later earthquakes, such as the 2012 quake in Emilia, the cost were estimated
by the Protezione Civile, the central government agency in charge of homeland security.
12In principle, tenants’ consumption may reflect a possible worsening of the housing rental
market. As the stock of housing is damaged by the earthquake, market forces may put pressures
on rents. There are however reasons to believe that this factor was weak in our case study.
First, in the emergency the government provided free or subsidized housing to the displaced
households (and rents were suspended when the housing units were not usable); second, and
more importantly, the Law (“Equo Canone”) regulated and capped rents in the 1980s.
12
1981 and 1982 was, respectively, Campania and Basilicata, and zero otherwise;
Dr is a binary variable indicating the household region of residence (Campania
or Basilicata) while Dt is a binary indicator that equals 0 in 1981 and 1 in 1982;
Xi,t denotes a vector of further control variables for household disposable income
as well as other household or householder characteristics, as defined above.
The binary variable Dr controls for time-invariant differences in consumption
across the two regions. Most importantly, the variableDt takes care of nation-wide
policies and cyclical factors, as well as changes in household expenditures which
are side-effect of the earthquake unrelated to transfers.13 The main coefficient
of interest is β3, attached to the interaction between the housing status and the
region’s access to the transfer program, namely HSs · TRr,t. This coefficient
measures how consumption differ across households in the earthquake area when
they first gain access to the transfer programme, relative to other residents who
are either not entitled to the program (tenants) or do not gain access to it in the
same year.14 In light of the fact that housing wealth is illiquid, and access to cash
transfers is a compensation for prospective costs of repairing material damages,
we naturally interpret β3 as accounting for the liquidity effect of transfers on
consumption.
Results The main results from estimating equation (2) are shown in Table 2.
As in the previous table, in Panel A the dependent variable is the level of con-
sumption; in Panel B the logarithm of consumption. In either Panel, the effect
of transfers on homeowners’ consumption is estimated relative to the alternative
control groups. In columns (1) through (3) of the table, the control group includes
homeowners in Basilicata in 1981 (before receiving cash in 1982), homeowners in
Campania in 1982 (the year after they gained access to the transfer), as well as
tenants in the earthquake area in both 1981 and 1982. In column (4), we drop
the tenants from the sample, and thus HSs and TRr,t from the regression model.
Finally, the model specification of column (1) only includes the region and year
dummies; that in column (2) includes the full set of controls but disposable in-
come, which is then added in column (3). The specification in column (4) (without
tenants) includes the full set of controls.
The empirical model essentially identifies the effect of transfers on spending by
13Together with the anomalous rise in durable consumption, after the earthquake we also note
a significant rise in the spread of households’ income in Campania and Basilicata. In particular,
the variance of disposable income in the earthquake area is about three times higher in 1981
than in 1980. This result is statistically significant at standard confidence levels. No evidence
of rising variability emerges when the same test is applied to the control area. Drawing on the
argument by Dardanoni (1991), among others, we can interpret these changes in the variability
of income as an indicator of a hike in income uncertainty.
14Observe that, if the variables Dr, HSs and TRr,t are dropped our empirical model becomes
similar to the baseline specification adopted by Parker et al. (2013), when a dummy variable is
used to represent the stimulus payment. If, instead, the group of tenants (and the variable TRr,t
and HSs) are dropped than our specification becomes similar to that in Broda and Parker (2014)
and also considered by Parker et al. (2013). In this case, the coefficient β3 would capture dif-
ferences in consumption only among households that receive the transfers and the identification
would only rely on the delay of including Basilicata in the transfer program.
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comparing consumption of homeowners in the years when they gain access to the
transfer programme (the treatment group), with the consumption of households—
including homeowners and tenants—that do not have access to the program during
those years (the control group). Looking at the results in the first column: in the
year homeowners gain access to the transfer cash, on average, they spend about
1 million of Italian liras more than the control group on nondurable goods. The
difference corresponds to 15 percentage points (see column 1, Panel B). Notably,
our estimates are not sensitive to adding controls: the coefficients are similar in
magnitude in columns 2 and 3, where we run the complete specification, without
and with the disposable income variable.15
Since tenants were not eligible to receive reconstruction transfers in any year, we
include them in our regression model as a way to control for potential confounding
effects of the earthquake on consumption: tenants face a variety of earthquake-
related shocks that are also faced by homeowners, but do not receive cash trans-
fers. In columns 2 and 3 of the Table, the variables HS specifically allows the
average consumption of recipients of reconstruction funds to differ from that of
non-recipients. Remarkably, the last column of the table suggests that our main
conclusion does not hinge on this control. In fact, our estimated coefficient re-
mains stable when we drop the tenants from the sample (and the variables HS
and TR from the set of controls).
The estimated impact consumption response to transfers in this second model
is consistent with the one obtained from our previous Difference-in-Differences
model, for the two-year period 1981-82. A comparison of the two estimates suggest
that the hike in consumption concentrated in the first year in which households
gained access to the transfer.
3.2.3 Marginal propensity to consume
In our findings, nondurable consumption by owner-occupiers in the earthquake
area follows the national trend over the post-earthquake period 1981-84 , yet it
displays an economically and statistically significant short-run rise at the time of
access to cash transfers. In this subsection, we translate this response in terms
of the households’ propensity to consume, by drawing on the official documents
recording the total and per capita magnitude of transfers in the earthquake area
during the 1980s.
Unfortunately, there is no single source providing a consolidated estimate of the
transfers. We need to combine data on applications to funds with estimates of
the costs of repairing and reconstruction activities by category of housing. Based
on the available official documentation (Commissione Parlamentare di Inchiesta,
1991), the number of collapsed and strongly damaged housing units was 352, 000—
a bit less than half the number of owner-occupiers residing in the disaster area.
15We should stress that the relative rise in nondurable expenditure by homeowners is not
associated with a reduction in durable expenditure. As said before, the latter is actually rising
on average in the earthquake area, possibly reflecting an earthquake-related shock to expenditure,
more so for homeowners than for tenants (see the Appendix for details).
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Owners of these units were entitled to receive, on average, a total transfer of 29
millions liras, and one fourth of this sum was paid up-front. Hence, we can estimate
that overall, in the aftermath of the earthquake (1981-82) owner-occupiers received
up to 2.5 trillion liras. To this amount, we need to add the funds provided to
owners of housing units with mild damage (the third category of eligible housing
units), amounting to about 1 trillion liras. This brings our estimate of the total
transfers to eligible households in the period 1981-82 to 3.5 trillions liras. The
1981 Italian census in 1981 sets to about 800,000 the number of owner-occupiers
residing in the earthquake area. Dividing through, we obtain an average transfer
of 4.5 million liras per household.
The results from our empirical analysis suggest that, during the period 1981-82,
the average expenditures on nondurables by owner-occupiers in the earthquake
area rose by 1.2 million liras relative to the pre-earthquake year; about 80 percent
of the increment occurred when households gained access to the transfer. We can
thus provide an estimate of the marginal propensity to consume out of transferred
cash at the start of the transfer program equal to 22 percent. Relative to the total
transfers accruing to the earthquake region between 1981 and 1989, the increase
in consumption in the two years after the earthquake is smaller, still as high as 7
percent.
Reassuringly, we obtain comparable estimates using alternative sources for cal-
culating the per-household transfer, namely, the total disbursements from Law
219/81 and the “Legge Stralcio.” According to the Law 219.81 (art. 3), over the
three-year period between 1981 and 1983 the earthquake area was entitled to a
total transfer sum of up to 5.7 trillions of 1981 liras. The “Legge Stralcio” in-
stead mandated a total of 2 trillions for reconstruction and repairing work. Based
on these figures, the implied marginal propensity to consume at the start of the
transfer is very similar to the estimate given above.
4 Heterogeneity in the consumption response to trans-
fers
In our first quasi-experiment, we find that owner-occupiers significantly respond
to transfers that cover the costs of housing repair work—lending support to the
idea that consumption rises in response to measures enhancing the liquidity of
portfolios owned by relatively wealthy households. In this section, we investi-
gate two further issues. The first is whether a higher average consumption by
homeowners as a group conceals different responses within the group. We may
expect that transfers had minimal impact on the consumption by unconstrained
households with liquid wealth, but had very strong impact on the consumption
by households with illiquid wealth. Only in recent years the SHIWs started to
collect information on portfolio composition and liquidity that would allow us to
refine our sample along these lines. Hence we use the 2012 earthquake in the
Emilia region as a complementary quasi-experiment to address this issue. The
second issue is whether the households’ consumption responds differently to cash
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transfers than the provision of the same services in kind, as was the case in the
aftermath of the earthquake that hit the area around L’Aquila in the Abruzzo
region in 2009.
4.1 The 2012 earthquake in Emilia: cash transfers
Relative to our first quasi-experiment, the Emilia earthquake, while strong, was
less destructive, and more concentrated geographically. Hitting an area that com-
prises 15 percent of the municipalities in the region, it resulted in 30,000 damaged
houses and a relatively low number of fatalities (27 in total).16
In response to the earthquake, the central government channeled 2.4 billions of
euros to support housing repairing activities in 53 municipalities. Public inter-
ventions were initially regulated by the Law D.L. 74/2012. In this law, the Art.
3 (paragraph 1, letter a) funded grants for repairing housing damages, in favor of
homeowners. Households were granted access to a tax credit against housing re-
pair costs, associated with a public guarantee on bank loans (Law D.L. 95/2012).
Specifically, Art. 3-bis entitled homeowners with a damaged housing unit to bank
loans guaranteed by the State (hence issued at low interest rates). Against the
cost of this loan, homeowners could claim a tax credit for the principal and in-
terest paid over the years. In practice, households borrowed from banks at a low
interest rate, and financed the cost of the loan by saving on taxes for a few years.
According to the press and local sources, the program was implemented quite
swiftly, with limited or no delay in setting up the administrative procedure.
4.1.1 Study design and econometric model
Recent SHIWs include a much richer set of information on households, compared
to the SHIWs used in our first experiment. In particular, the recent surveys follow
a panel of households. Thus, we can also estimate our model in growth rates, as
well as in levels. In addition, the surveys include a wide range of questions on
household portfolios, which enable us to refine the treatment group by distinguish-
ing households according to indicators of liquidity.
The earthquake in Emilia occurred in the first semester of 2012—which is a
survey year. Hence, we can study the consumption behavior of owner-occupiers
in Emilia just after the earthquake. Our empirical model consists of the following
Difference-in-Differences regression:
Ci = α+ β1HSi + β2EMILIAi + β3 (HSi · EMILIAi) + γXi + ui, (3)
where C is the logarithm of the household nondurable consumption expenditure,
HS (standing for ‘Housing Status’) is a dummy equal to one if the housing status
of the household is owner-occupier, while EMILIA is a dummy equal to one for
residents in Emilia in the year of the earthquake. The vector X contains the
same controls used in our analysis of the 1980 earthquake (employment status of
16Unfortunately recent SHIWs no longer contain information that we can use to assess the
response of durable expenditure.
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the householder, disposable income and number of components of the household).
As in the previous section, the parameter of interest is β3: a significant positive
estimate would indicate different consumption behavior for households receiving
a transfer after the earthquake.
The control area is defined either by all Italian regions outside the disaster
area, or by four regions adjacent to Emilia, namely, Liguria, Toscana, Marche and
Umbria—excluding, in either case, the regions of Lombardia and Veneto, since
some parts of these regions were also affected by the earthquake. It turns out
that results are qualitatively identical across alternative definitions of the control
group.
By exploiting the detailed information provided by recent waves of the SHIW,
we can distinguish households according to whether they are liquid or illiquid.
In particular, we build an index of wealth illiquidity, ILLIQUID, identifying the
group of wealthy-hand-to-mouth owner-occupiers in our sample. Wealthy but
illiquid households correspond to the group of owners of real estate (house and
land) who, before the earthquake (at the beginning of 2011): (i) held liquid assets
(the sum of cash and bank deposits) amounting to less than 50 percent of their
disposable income and (ii) were in debt with a bank, e.g. had a mortgage. This
definition draws on recent contributions to the literature on transfers. Specifically,
the ratio of liquid wealth to income is in line with the definition proposed by
Kaplan et al. (2014) and the work by Misra and Surico (2014), who—in revisiting
the recent episodes of tax credit in US—show that the consumption response to
transfers is stronger by mortgagors. It is worth stressing that, in our data, the
group of owner-occupiers virtually overlaps with the subsample of households with
positive wealth.
We test for the relevance of liquidity as follows. First, we add the index ILLIQ-
UID interacted with HS·EMILIA, to the baseline specification (3). Second, we
split the sample according to this index and re-estimate our empirical model for
the two subsamples (after dropping HS and HS·EMILIA).17 Third, we exploit
the data panel to control for household characteristics (potentially correlated with
the region of residence), by taking the first difference of household consumption
with respect to 2010. In this last case, we estimate the following specification
twice, for liquid or illiquid households, respectively:
∆Ci = α+ βEMILIAi + ρZi + εi. (4)
where Z is the vector of controls, which now includes also the growth rate of
disposable income.
4.1.2 Results
Results in level for the whole sample, including all tenants and owner-occupiers,
are shown in the first two columns of Table 3. According to column (1), after the
17Note that according to our index of illiquidity two households are identified as illiquid ten-
ants. Hence, we drop them from the sample. Results are however unchanged if we treat those
households as liquid.
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earthquake the nondurable consumption by all (liquid and illiquid) homeowners
in Emilia is not significantly different relative to homeowners in the control area.
However, this result conceals important heterogeneity in the response of different
groups of households. In the specification in the second column of Table 3, we add
to our baseline the index ILLIQUID interacted with HS·EMILIA. The coefficient
of this interaction term is positive and significantly different from zero, indicating
that the consumption by the illiquid homeowners is about 15 percent higher in
Emilia than in the control area.
In the rest of the table, we restrict our analysis to homeowners only, and split this
subsample according to the variable ILLIQUID. Columns (3) and (4) show that
the consumption of homeowners in the earthquake area is significantly different
from that of the control group for the illiquid households, but not the liquid ones.
For the former group, the difference in consumption across areas is economically
and statistically significant: the consumption of illiquid homeowners in Emilia is
estimated to be 23 percent higher than that of the illiquid homeowners in the
control area.
As regards robustness of our results, we start by noting that including liquid
tenants to the specification in column (3) has virtually no effect on our estimates.
Running a Difference-in-Differences regression on the larger sample, the estimate
of the key coefficient is virtually the same as the one reported in the table (where
the sample is restricted to homeowners). In addition, our results are not sensitive
to extending the control area to the whole Italy. Once again, consumption in the
earthquake area differs from the control only for the illiquid households (results
not reported in the table).18
By running the model in growth rates, we show that the differential response
across groups of households is not due to a possible upward bias in the level
specification. As apparent from Table 4, our estimated consumption response
become stronger when we run the model in the growth-rate specification: the point
estimate of the post-earthquake nondurable consumption by illiquid homeowners
is 25 percent higher in the earthquake area relative to the control area. As in the
previous exercises, we do not detect any statistically significant difference for the
liquid households (whether or not tenants are included in the sample).19
Finally, our results are not affected by including lagged consumption growth.
We do so in the model shown in the last two columns of Table 4. The coefficient
estimates are virtually unchanged relative to the other columns, suggesting that
our results are not driven by differential trends of the consumption of illiquid
homeowners unrelated to the transfers—i.e., the change in consumption we detect
is specific to the Emilia region after the earthquake.
18In this dimension, our study contributes to a small literature exploiting natural disasters
as quasi-experiments. Most notably, earlier work by (Sawada and Shimizutani, 2008) studies
households’ consumption around the 1995 earthquake in Kobe, Japan, based on retrospective
surveys. These authors focus on the different behavior across households, depending on whether
they were credit-constrained before the disaster.
19The table reports evidence relative to liquid homeowners without tenants. The same con-
clusion applies if we estimate a Difference-in-Differences regression adding tenants.
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4.1.3 Marginal propensity to consume
Following the same methodology as for the earthquake in the South of Italy, we
close our analysis by producing a comparable estimate of the marginal propensity
to consume out of transfers of the Emilian households. Relative to our previous
exercise, however, we are now able to provide an estimate specific to illiquid owner-
occupiers.
From institutional sources (Law D.L. 95/2012 3-bis), we obtain an estimate of
the total transfers as high as 6 billion euros. Based on the 2010 census, we can
estimate the number of owner-occupiers in the Emilia provinces included in the
disaster area, equal to 797,245, to derive a per-household transfer equal to 7,526
euros per household.
According to the result shown in column 1 of Table 3, the impact increase in
consumption, averaged across liquid and illiquid owner-occupiers, is 2,000 euros.
Hence, for the average owner-occupier in the region, the implied average propen-
sity to consume out of the transfer amounts to 26.6 percent. Remarkably, this
figure is not far from the corresponding, average, estimate for the earthquake in
the South of Italy in 1980.
Focusing on illiquid households only (column 2 of the same table), however,
the magnitude of the marginal propensity to consume changes markedly. The
impact increase in consumption for this group is 4300 euros, implying a marginal
propensity to consume as high as 57 percent, twice as high as the average not
distinguishing across groups. This evidence suggests that the average surge in
consumption that we detect in the 1980 case study in South of Italy—comparable
to that found in Emilia—may also be to a large extent driven by the behavior of
illiquid households.
Overall our results lend support to the hypothesis that the wealthy hand-to-
mouth households significantly increase their consumption in response to transfers—
in line with Broda and Parker (2014) and Misra and Surico (2014)—while house-
holds with liquid wealth do not, in line with the permanent income theory (see,
for instance, Souleles, 1999). It is worth emphasizing that the magnitude of our
estimates is not out of line with the results from the literature reviewed in Section
2 of the paper. Despite differences across type of experiments and institutional
context, many studies find a comparably strong response to transfers.
4.2 The 2009 earthquake in Abruzzo: in-kind transfers
Based on our last quasi-experiment, we can shed light on the question of whether
the nature of the transfers—whether in cash or in kind—makes a difference for
households’ consumption. The earthquake that hit the area around the city of
L’Aquila in 2009 affected 57 municipalities, out of the 305 municipalities in the
Abruzzo region. The epicenter was close to the city of L’Aquila, which suffered the
most pervasive damages. The earthquake caused serious damages to 10,000 build-
ings, and resulted in 309 fatalities. Also in this case, the government implemented
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a massive reconstruction program.20 Unlike the other earthquakes in our study,
however, the government paid directly the construction companies carrying out
the reconstruction work, rather than financing this work by providing households
with targeted funds. For this case study, the available survey data are for 2008
and 2010— the year before and the year after that of the earthquake.
We estimate a similar equation to that specified for the previous case study,
replacing the dummy EMILIA with the dummy ABRUZZO and considering the
group of households accordingly. Results are shown in Table 5. Different from
the previous cases, we find no evidence of a rise in the non-durable consump-
tion by homeowners residing in the earthquake region, regardless of whether the
household is liquid or illiquid.21 This evidence suggests that wealth illiquidity is
not correlated with higher consumption growth in response to a transfer, if such
transfer is in kind instead of cash.
5 Liquidity constraints
In the previous sections we have provided evidence that ‘wealthy hand-to-mouth’
households spend on non-durable goods a non-negligible share of cash transfers
that accrue to them in advance of future financial commitments. Interpreting
the cash transfers in our experiments as loans, we may think of our evidence as
resulting from an ideal experiment in which all homeowners were ‘forced’ (by the
shock) to take on a loan; homeowners with low wealth liquidity and bank debt
acted consistent with the presence of binding liquidity constraints. According to
this interpretation, if our illiquid households had access to a loan, they would have
drawn resources to finance current expenditures on nondurables. We conclude our
analysis by providing further (standard) evidence supporting this view.
In particular, we are interested in verifying whether, in our sample of homeown-
ers, we can detect violations of the permanent-income hypothesis (PIH) which can
be attributed to the presence of liquidity constraints. This exercise would com-
plement our evidence by stressing the limited extent to which relatively wealthy
owner-occupiers can rely on their housing wealth for consumption smoothing pur-
poses in the years of our case studies in Abruzzo and Emilia. We focus on viola-
tions of two basic implications of the PIH: (i) changes in consumption should be a
good predictor for current and future changes in income (Campbell and Mankiw,
1990); (ii) changes in consumption should not be correlated with past changes in
income (Hall, 1978).22 Results based on merging survey data for 2012 and 2010
are shown in Table 6. With the goal of emphasizing that our results are not driven
by the households in the disaster area, the table report evidence for all Italian re-
20Public interventions were regulated by the Law D.L. 39/2009 (28 April) for the emergency
phase, and by the Laws D.L.195/2009 and D.L. 83/2012 for the post-emergency phase.
21This is not to say that transfers were ‘ineffective’ as regards to demand and economic activity,
but their assessment would require a study of firms dynamics operating in the area, and spillovers
outside the earthquake area.
22See Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) for a recent survey of tests of the permanent-income
hypothesis and Guiso et al. (1994) for historical evidence on liquidity constraints in Italy.
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gions but those hit by the two recent earthquakes, that is Emilia and Abruzzo.
However, our conclusions are unaffected if we include all regions in the sample, or
restrict the sample to the disaster areas only.
In the first two columns of Table 6, we report results about the predictive power
of consumption changes for the two subsamples of liquid and illiquid homeowners,
split according to our index of wealth liquidity. Note that the right-hand side of
our regressions includes the lagged changes of both consumption and income—
we test the predictive power of changes in consumption that are orthogonal to
contemporaneous changes in income, so to avoid issues potentially raised by their
correlation.
The difference across groups is apparent. For homeowners with a high wealth
liquidity (column 1), the empirical evidence is consistent with the permanent-
income hypothesis: changes in consumption anticipate future changes in income—
over a horizon of two years. Conversely, for households with a mortgage and poor
liquidity (column 2) changes in consumption do not have predictive power for
future income. It is worth stressing that, across groups, there is no asymmetry
as regards two important variables. The first is the lagged change in income;
the second (not reported in the Table) is the change in the number of household
components across the two dates, taken as a proxy for the growth in households’
need for food between t and t + 2 (see Zeldes, 1989). The coefficients on these
two variables are basically the same across liquid and illiquid households. The key
difference across groups concerns the coefficient capturing the role of liquidity.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the results shown in column 3 and
4 of Table 6, where we exploit the other basic implication of the permanent-
income hypothesis—that changes in consumption should not be correlated with
past changes in income. The evidence suggests that changes in income are useful
to forecast future changes in consumption for the group of illiquid homeowners,
not (or very weakly so) for the liquid ones.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we make an empirical contribution to the body of literature pro-
viding micro-econometric evidence that liquidity is a key determinant of effects of
transfers on consumption demand. We focus on three quasi-experiments, in which
households receive sizable transfers against the costs of repairing housing damages
caused by the random shock of an earthquake. The qualifying feature of two of our
quasi-experiments is that, while these transfers have a strictly preset destination
(financing reconstruction work), a significant share of funds is made available to
eligible households up-front, in anticipation of future expenditure. Hence, by the
very nature, these transfers are akin to loans: their key effect consists of rising
the liquidity of households’ portfolios in the short run. In all cases, by design, the
transfer programme is targeted to households (homeowners) who are on average
not poor but may not be liquid.
In our findings, the transfer programme has no effect on consumption of eligible
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households over a multi-year horizon, when reconstruction takes place (a key result
for the earthquake in the South of Italy). This evidence confirms the transfers in
our studies are not a gift, over and above the cost of housing repair work. Yet, on
impact, the access to cash up-front has a statistically and economically significant
effect on homeowners’ nondurable consumption.
Grouping liquid and illiquid households together, our estimates of the average
marginal propensity to consume out the transfer funds are equal to 22 percent
(South of Italy) and 27 percent (Emilia). This average estimates, however, mask
important heterogeneity across groups. For the Emilia case study for which we
have detailed data on wealth, we find that, despite eligibility to transfers, liquid
homeowners in the disaster area behave no differently than homeowners residing
outside the area. Conversely, the group of illiquid households features a very high
marginal propensity to consume out of cash transfers, in our estimates equal to
57 percent. This evidence suggests that the average surge in consumption that
we detect in the 1980 case study in South of Italy—comparable to that found
in Emilia—may be an average combining the ‘no response’ by liquid households,
with a large response by illiquid ones.
Finally, for our Abruzzo case study, where households receive the equivalent of
the cash transfers in reconstruction services, i.e., in kind, we find no evidence of an
increase in consumption, independently of the liquidity of a household’s wealth.
This result is a complementary piece of evidence supporting our conclusion, that
the positive consumption response to transfers we detect in the other cases is
driven by the homeowners’ access to cash.
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Table 1: Consumption after the 1980 Earthquake in the south of italy
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Nondurable consumption (level)
QUAKE -64.13 600.35∗∗ -1215.70∗∗∗
(272.29) (294.14) (302.43)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Quake Area FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.46 0.49
Observations 11078 6079 9395
Panel B: Nondurable consumption (log)
QUAKE 0.04 0.09∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Quake Area FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.56 0.50 0.53
Observations 11078 6079 9395
Note: The table shows the results from Difference-in-Differences regression models, com-
paring owner-occupiers that reside in the disaster area with owner-occupiers in the rest of
Italy. The left-hand side variable is the non-durable consumption in panel A and its natural
logarithm in panel B. In column 1 and 2 we compare, respectively, nondurable consumption
in 1981-84 and 1981-82 with consumption in 1980. In column 3 we compare consumption in
1981-82 with consumption in 1983-84. All regressions contain a dummy identifying the earth-
quake area, year-specific dummies, and the full set of controls detailed in the text. QUAKE
identifies, respectively, owner-occupiers in the earthquake area during 1981-84 (first specifi-
cation), 1981-82 (second specification) or 1983-84 (third specification). Standard errors are
robust and reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2: Consumption and Liquidity-enhancing Transfers: the 1980
earthquake in south of italy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Nondurable consumption (level)
HS*TR 1081.82∗∗∗ 1072.30∗∗ 1085.48∗∗ 1395.72∗∗∗
(304.81) (441.44) (425.98) (459.65)
TR (Transfer Region) 14.26 -233.99
(415.66) (392.10)
HS (Housing Status) 161.84 100.45
(371.78) (364.14)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.45 0.48 0.54
Observations 672 672 672 288
Panel B: Nondurable consumption (log)
HS*TR 0.15∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
TR (Transfer Region) -0.03 -0.05
(0.05) (0.05)
HS (Housing Status) 0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.48 0.50 0.52
Observations 672 672 672 288
Note: The table shows the response of nondurable consumption by homeowners at the time
of access to the transfer funds. The sample consists of households in Campania and Basilicata
during 1981-82. The left-hand side variable is the nondurable consumption in panel A and
its natural logarithm in panel B. The variable HS (standing for Housing Status) is a dummy
that is equal to one if the housing status of the household is owner-occupier; TR (for Transfer
Region ) is a dummy that is equal to one in the year t when the region of residence r is
included in the transfer programme. In the first column we only control with region and year
dummies. In the second column we add controls for the number of household components,
the number of household earners and their unexpected earnings, a full set of dummies for
human capital and occupations of householders. In the third column we also add disposable
income. In the last column we report results excluding tenants from the sample. Standard
errors are robust and reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted as follows:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Consumption and Liquidity-enhancing Transfers: the 2012
earthquake in Emilia, Log Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HS*EMILIA 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.23∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07)
HS*EMILIA*ILLIQUID 0.15∗∗
(0.06)
EMILIA 0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
HS 0.08∗ 0.08∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.53
Observations 1002 1002 634 164
Note: The table shows the response of nondurable consumption by homeowners in Emilia
at the time of access to the transfer funds. The control area includes the regions of Liguria,
Tuscany, Marche and Umbria, which are adjacent to Emilia. The left-hand side variable
is the natural logarithm of non-durable consumption in 2012. EMILIA is a dummy identi-
fying households in Emilia, HS is a dummy identifying owner-occupier householders, while
ILLIQUID is a dummy identifying liquidity constrained households. It equals one if, at the
beginning of the year before the earthquake, the level of household’s liquid asset is lower
than 50 percent of disposable income and the householder has a mortgage, and 0 otherwise.
All equations include controls for the number of the components and the disposable income
of the households, as well as for the age, human capital and occupation of householders.
The first column reports our baseline specification. The specification in the second column
adds the index of liquidity to the set of controls. In the last two columns we restrict our
sample to homeowners and we split the sample according to whether homeowners are liquid
(column 3) or illiquid (column 4). Standard errors are robust and reported in parentheses.
Statistical significance is denoted as follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Consumption Growth after Liquidity-Enhancing Transfers
in Emilia
Liquid Illiquid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EMILIA 0.03 0.06 0.23∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
Lag ∆C No Yes No Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.27 0.29 0.42
Observations 634 634 164 164
Note: The table compares the growth rate of nondurable consumption across homeowners
residing in the Emilia region and the control area, including the regions of Liguria, Tus-
cany, Marche and Umbria. In the first two columns, the sample is restricted to the liquid
households, while in the last two columns the sample is restricted to the illiquid ones (the
definition of liquidity is reported in the text). The left-hand side variable is the bi-annual
growth rate of non-durable consumption over the 2010-12 period. EMILIA is a dummy iden-
tifying households residing in Emilia. The set of controls includes the number of components
of the household and the growth rate of its disposable income, as well as the householder’s
age, human capital and occupation. In the second and fourth columns we add the lag of
consumption growth rate to the controls. Standard errors are robust and reported in paren-
theses. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 5: Consumption Growth and in-kind Transfers: the 2009 earth-
quake in Abruzzo
Liquid Illiquid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ABRUZZO 0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.23) (0.20)
Lag ∆C No Yes No Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.23 0.05 0.22
Observations 703 703 158 158
Note: The table shows results from comparing the growth rate of nondurable consumption
by homeowners in the Abruzzo region with that by homeowners in the control area. In the
first two columns the sample is restricted to the liquid households, while in the last two
the sample is restricted to the illiquid ones (the liquidity definition is reported in the text).
The left-hand side variable is the bi-annual growth rate of non-durable consumption over
the 2008-10 period. ABRUZZO is a dummy identifying households residing in Abruzzo.
The set of controls includes the number of components and the growth rate of disposable
income of the household, as well as the householder’s age, human capital and occupation. In
the second and fourth columns we add the lag of consumption growth rate to the controls.
Standard errors are robust and reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted
as follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Forecasting Income or Consumption
Income Growth Consumption Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag ∆C 0.07∗∗∗ 0.03 -0.38∗∗∗ -0.43∗∗∗
(3.75) (1.24) (-18.54) (-12.95)
Lag ∆Y -0.39∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(-11.71) (-7.27) (1.72) (2.69)
Observations 3700 908 3700 908
Note: The table reports results from testing the predictive power of (i) consumption changes
(∆C) for future income (columns 1 and 2), and (ii) income changes (∆Y ) for future changes
in consumption (columns 3 and 4). We distinguish between liquid (columns 1 and 3) and
illiquid (column 2 and 4) households according to the same definition of liquidity used in
previous exercises and given in the text. As above, the set of controls includes the number
of components of the household, as well as the age, education, employment status of the
householder, the sector where she works, and an index of the size of the municipality where
the household resides. To these controls, we add the lag income growth in columns 1 and 2
, and the lag of consumption growth rate in columns 3 and 4. The sample covers all Italian
regions but those hit by the two recent earthquakes (Emilia and Abruzzo) for the years 2010
and 2012. Standard errors are robust and reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is
denoted as follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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